Superstate USCC

Contract Addresses

Core addresses and owner roles re-verified onchain Jul 3, 2026.

Contract	Address
USCC Token (Proxy)	0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c
USCC Implementation (SuperstateTokenV5, VERSION "5")	0x9b7282Cb80baA4B1F8F6436f8D531B436BaE2A70
USCC ProxyAdmin	0x2Bb7B8B4dF7fD96baF7CB9a2Ce9e292eCd5BAF3D
AllowList V3.1 (Proxy, shared with USTB)	0x02f1fA8B196d21c7b733EB2700B825611d8A38E5
Chainlink USCC NAV Oracle (OffchainAggregator wrapper)	0xAfFd8F5578E8590665de561bdE9E7BAdb99300d9
Chainlink USCC Aggregator (OCR-style)	0x5C00518D3d423EC59D553Af123Be8a63B11078CF
Aggregator owner (Chainlink-controlled)	0x21f73D42Eb58Ba49dDB685dc29D3bF5c0f0373CA

Owner Addresses

Verified onchain Jul 3, 2026. All Superstate-controlled admin keys are EOAs:

Onchain, these owners are plain EOAs. Superstate states that admin keys use Turnkey secure enclaves, but that is an offchain operational control and cannot be independently verified from Ethereum contract state. This report therefore scores the owner addresses as EOAs for governance purposes; any MPC / TEE / Turnkey protection is treated only as an offchain mitigation.

Role	Address
USCC Token Owner + USCC ProxyAdmin Owner (same EOA)	0x8abC89D9b56dFD90dA18e8E18CFaC9111100bDd1
AllowList Owner (shared with USTB)	0x7747940aDBc7191f877a9B90596E0DA4f8deb2Fe
Chainlink USCC NAV Aggregator Owner (Chainlink, not Superstate)	0x21f73D42Eb58Ba49dDB685dc29D3bF5c0f0373CA

Note that the prior USCC owner was 0x8c7db8a96d39f76d9f456db23d591c2fdd0e2f8a; ownership was transferred on Oct 31, 2024 (tx 0xd2d1c711…) via the Ownable2StepUpgradeable flow.

Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures

USCC reuses the same SuperstateTokenV5 implementation family as USTB and the same shared AllowList V3.1 contract, so the audit surface overlaps substantially. Per the Superstate Security page (as exposed via llms-full.txt), Superstate has commissioned 11 numbered 0xMacro audits, plus a ChainSecurity audit and Offside Labs Solana audit. Certora formal verification is referenced in the broader Security overview, but USCC-specific findings are not enumerated separately.

Audit History

#	Firm	Approx. Date	Scope
A-1..9	0xMacro	Jul 2024 – Jul 2025	Token + Redemption + AllowList across V1→V3.1 — see USTB report for individual findings
A-10	0xMacro	Jul 2024 - Nov 2025	0xmacro.com/library/audits/superstate-10
A-11	0xMacro	Feb 2026	0xmacro.com/library/audits/superstate-11
--	ChainSecurity	2023	Compound SUPTB (original USTB token)
--	Certora	April 2025	Formal verification

Smart Contract Complexity: Moderate. Standard upgradeable EIP-1967 transparent proxy (legacy storage slot pattern: implementation accessible via ProxyAdmin.getProxyImplementation, not the canonical EIP-1967 slot). ERC-20 with AllowList-gated transfers, Ownable2StepUpgradeable access, cross-chain bridging via burn-and-mint to Solana (Token-2022) and Plume.

A key observation onchain: USCC has a strict subset of the V5 token's capabilities enabled:

• superstateOracle() = 0x0 — no Superstate Continuous Price Oracle attached
• redemptionContract() = 0x0 — no RedemptionIdle / atomic onchain redemption
• supportedStablecoins(USDC) = 0x0 — no onchain stablecoin subscribe config
• supportedChainIds(1) = false - bridging destinations all return false via the uint256 getter
• subscribe() - reverts with OnchainSubscriptionsDisabled() (selector 0xdbf0cc51)

So all USCC mint operations are admin-driven (mint/bulkMint by the owner EOA) and the only onchain user actions are transfer (AllowList-gated), offchainRedeem (burn, settled offchain T+1), and bridge to Solana/Plume.

Bug Bounty

• Platform: Self-hosted (security@superstate.co)
• Formal Rewards: None — "Superstate does not have a formal reward policy"
• Safe Harbor: CFAA and DMCA safe harbor language for good-faith researchers
• Note: Same weakness as USTB. Not on the SEAL Safe Harbor registry.

Historical Track Record

• Fund Launch: July 15, 2024 onchain (first mint at block 20312293, Unix ts 1721051099). DeFiLlama first records Sep 9, 2024 at ~$15.7M TVL. Nearly 24 months in production as of Jul 3, 2026.
• Contract Upgrades: Token implementation reports VERSION "5". Earlier USCC versions (V1→V4) were upgraded through the same ProxyAdmin path used by USTB. Each version was audited prior to deployment.
• Smart Contract Exploits: None reported.
• Ownership Changes: USCC token ownership was transferred Oct 31, 2024 from 0x8c7db8a9… to 0x8abC89D9… via the two-step Ownable flow (Etherscan tx).
• TVL History (DeFiLlama):
  • Sep 2024 (first record): ~$15.7M
  • Oct 2024: ~$27M
  • Nov 21, 2025 peak: ~$496.61M
  • Jul 3, 2026: ~$136.18M public TVL; Superstate reports $162.79M AUM including book-entry
• NAV History: NAV launched near $10.00, sits at $11.628080 as of the latest Chainlink USCC round (updated Jul 2, 2026 13:10 UTC; verified Jul 3, 2026). Unlike USTB, NAV is not monotonic — the protocol's own docs warn that "daily NAV reflects mark-to-market gains and losses, including unrealized valuation changes" and that basis expansion can produce temporary NAV declines.
• Incidents: None publicly reported.

Funds Management

Yield Sources

1. Crypto basis (cash-and-carry): Long spot/custodied crypto assets, short futures at CFTC-permitted Trading Venues. Current Bitwise public holdings identify BTC, ETH, SOL, and XRP exposure, with futures on CME and an XRP futures leg on Coinbase.
2. Staked crypto / liquid staking tokens: Current public holdings include staked SOL, weETH, and a small JitoSOL position; staking and liquid-staking losses can flow through NAV.
3. U.S. Treasury Bills: Idle cash and futures-margin reserves earn short-dated Treasury yield (federal-funds-rate-like).

The fund "will trade only those digital assets for which the CFTC has permitted exchange-listed futures contracts" (per Steakhouse overview). Bitwise's current public holdings identify CME and Coinbase futures exposure, but the public documents still do not fully disclose margin policy, counterparty concentration limits, or whether the displayed venues are exhaustive over time.

Public holdings snapshot: Bitwise publishes current USCC holdings on its USCC fund page. The table below uses the public holdings shown there as of Jun 28, 2026 4pm EDT. Holdings are unaudited and may change at the investment manager's discretion; refresh this table from the Bitwise page during the next reassessment.

Holding	Quantity	Implied Yield	Notional Value	Portfolio %	Notes
USD Collateral	32,267,833.00	0.82%	$32.27M	19.45%	Cash / margin collateral
USTB	2,796,828.74	3.47%	$31.13M	18.76%	Tokenized T-Bill exposure
Bitcoin Custody	39.20 BTC	0.00%	$2.37M	1.43%	Spot crypto custody
Ether Custody	2,350.99 ETH	0.00%	$3.82M	2.30%	Spot crypto custody
Solana Custody	7,578.53 SOL	0.00%	$0.57M	0.35%	Spot crypto custody
Solana Staked	439,118.49 SOL	6.29%	$33.31M	20.08%	Staking / validator risk
EtherFi Wrapped eETH	17,801.49 weETH	2.49%	$31.73M	19.12%	Liquid-staking-token risk
Ripple Custody	28,631,438.36 XRP	0.00%	$30.72M	18.52%	Spot crypto custody
JitoSOL Custody	4.02 JitoSOL	5.68%	$393	0.00%	Small liquid-staking-token position
SOL JUL26 75 Call (CME)	6,000.00	0.00%	$42,300	0.03%	Option exposure
BTC Future JUL26 (CME)	-35.00	3.00%	-$2.13M	-1.28%	Short futures hedge
ETH Future JUL26 (CME)	-21,600.00	2.93%	-$35.14M	-21.18%	Short futures hedge
SOL Future JUL26 (CME)	-445,000.00	2.91%	-$33.84M	-20.40%	Short futures hedge
XRP Future JUL26 (CME)	-27,950,000.00	5.41%	-$30.13M	-18.16%	Short futures hedge
XRP Future JUL26 (Coinbase)	-560,000.00	9.42%	-$0.61M	-0.37%	Short futures hedge

Accessibility

• KYC Required: Yes — Qualified Purchaser ($5M+ individuals, $25M+ institutions) AND Accredited Investor status. 29 supported jurisdictions including U.S., Cayman, BVI, Bermuda, UK, Canada, Singapore, UAE, etc.
• Minimum Investment: $100,000.
• Subscriptions (Minting):
  • Onchain atomic via subscribe(): DISABLED — verified onchain. Calling subscribe(...) reverts with OnchainSubscriptionsDisabled() (selector 0xdbf0cc51). supportedStablecoins(USDC) returns the zero address with zero fee. Subscriptions are processed offchain only (T+1).
  • Offchain: USD wire or USDC transfer. T+1 if received before 5pm ET on a Market Day; T+2 otherwise.
  • Per docs: "There is no minimum redemption amount" but a $100K minimum applies to subscriptions unless waived.
• Redemptions (Burning):
  • Onchain atomic: NOT AVAILABLE — redemptionContract() returns 0x0 onchain. There is no RedemptionIdle contract for USCC.
  • Offchain: Send tokens to a redemption address or call offchainRedeem(uint256) which burns USCC. Proceeds paid as USD wire or USDC on Ethereum/Solana. T+1 if request received before 5pm ET on a Market Day; T+2 otherwise.
  • No redemption fees per docs (investor pays gas).
• Geographic Restrictions: 29 jurisdictions per docs. Not available to sanctioned countries.
• Management Fee: 0.75% annually (waived until AUM exceeds $50M — now exceeded).

Token Mint Authority

Mint mechanism: Ownable — a single owner EOA controls minting.

Mint requires backing: No — mint(address,uint256) and bulkMint(address[],uint256[]) are gated by onlyOwner and do not check or pull collateral onchain. Backing exists offchain at Anchorage Digital / Trading Venues and is asserted by the operator. The onchain mint is a unilateral admin action.

Per-address mint authority (verified onchain Jul 3, 2026, USCC token 0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c):

Address	Can Mint	Can Burn	Role / Mechanism	Notes
0x8abC89D9b56dFD90dA18e8E18CFaC9111100bDd1	✓	✓ (adminBurn)	owner() of USCC token (Ownable)	EOA (code size 0, nonce 589). Same EOA is owner() of USCC ProxyAdmin, so it can also upgrade() the implementation to a malicious one and effectively grant mint power to anyone.
(no other onchain minters)	—	—	—	The V5 token contract has no AccessControl / MINTER_ROLE; hasRole(...) reverts.

Rate limits / supply caps: None onchain. There is no maxMintPerBlock, no global supply cap, no per-minter quota.

Backing check at mint time: None onchain. Backing is settled offchain; minted USCC is asserted to be 100% backed by the offchain portfolio (Anchorage cash + crypto + futures collateral + T-Bills) but this is not enforced or verified by any onchain mechanism.

Collateralization

• Backing Model: Hybrid offchain — USCC tokens represent shares in a fund holding:
  • Spot / staked crypto assets at Anchorage Digital Bank N.A. and related custody / staking venues
  • Short futures positions and posted margin at Trading Venues (current public holdings identify CME and Coinbase exposure)
  • U.S. Treasury Bills / USTB, USD collateral, and other cash-equivalent reserves
• Collateral Quality:
  • T-Bills are the safest asset class globally
  • Spot / staked crypto custody carries crypto custody risk (key management, staking or liquid-staking losses, custodian operational risk)
  • Futures-leg margin posted at trading venues is the dominant counterparty risk — if a futures venue becomes insolvent or fails operationally, the margin and any unrealized P&L on that venue is at risk. CFTC-regulated futures clearinghouses (CME-style) significantly reduce this risk vs offshore venues, but Superstate still does not publicly disclose full counterparty concentration or margin policy.
  • Basis-trade losses flow through NAV. If futures basis widens, futures positions are forcibly unwound, or posted margin is impaired, USCC holders can realize losses on principal.
• Manager / Sub-Advisor:
  • Investment manager: Bitwise Investment Manager, LLC (per superstate.com/assets/uscc, accessed Jul 3, 2026)
  • Sub-advisor: Superstate Advisers LLC
  • This is a recent operational change from the prior Superstate self-managed setup and should continue to be monitored post-transition.
• Bankruptcy Remoteness: Fund is a series within Superstate Asset Trust (Delaware Statutory Trust) with inter-series liability protection — bankruptcy-remote from Superstate Inc.
• Verification: Ernst & Young annual audit. NAV Fund Services for independent NAV calculation. Daily NAV is mark-to-market, so unrealized losses on the futures leg do flow into the share price.

Provability

• NAV/Price Updates: Chainlink USCC NAV feed 0xAfFd8F5578E8590665de561bdE9E7BAdb99300d9 — an OCR (off-chain reporting) aggregator wrapper around 0x5C00518D3d…. 16 Chainlink-operated transmitters reach consensus on the daily NAV from Superstate. The aggregator owner is 0x21f73D42…, a Chainlink-controlled contract (not Superstate). This is the only onchain NAV source for USCC — unlike USTB, USCC has no Superstate Continuous Price Oracle, so there is no linear-interpolation extrapolation between checkpoints; the price is the most recent OCR transmission only.
• Offchain Assets: Cash collateral, USTB / Treasury exposure, spot crypto, staked / liquid-staked crypto, and futures positions are all held offchain. Token holders cannot independently verify positions onchain. Independent verification layers:
  • NAV Fund Services (independent NAV agent)
  • Ernst & Young (annual audit)
  • Anchorage Digital (regulated digital-asset custody)
  • SEC regulatory framework (Reg D / Section 3(c)(7))
• Reserve Transparency: Bitwise publishes headline NAV/AUM/yield, network balances, DeFi integrations, and current holdings on bitwiseinvestments.com/crypto-funds/uscc. Public holdings now include asset quantities, implied yields, notional values, portfolio weights, and current futures venues, but margin balances, counterparty concentration policy, historical venue usage, and T-Bill / USTB look-through details are still not fully disclosed publicly.
• NAV Mark-to-Market Risk: Because the futures leg is mark-to-market daily, the share price reflects unrealized basis-trade P&L in real time. The protocol explicitly warns of "unrealized losses" during basis expansion. This is fundamentally different from USTB whose underlying T-Bills have a much smoother mark-to-market profile.

Liquidity Risk

• Primary Exit: Offchain redemption only — burn USCC via offchainRedeem(uint256) or send to a redemption address, then receive USDC/USD T+1 (before 5pm ET on Market Days) or T+2 (after 5pm or weekends/holidays).
• No Onchain Atomic Redemption: Verified onchain: redemptionContract() = 0x0. There is no USDC-backed RedemptionIdle contract like USTB has — USCC has zero instant onchain exit capacity at any size.
• No DEX Liquidity: $0 DEX volume by design. AllowList-gated transfers prevent secondary markets.
• Transfer Restrictions: All transfers require both sender and receiver to be on the AllowList (the same shared V3.1 contract as USTB). Removing an address from the AllowList freezes their tokens.
• DeFi Integrations: Smaller than USTB but live. Bitwise reports USCC support in Aave on Ethereum (~4.60M USCC / $53.47M TVL), Kamino on Solana (~652k USCC / $7.58M TVL), and Morpho on Ethereum (de minimis USCC) as of Jul 2, 2026. Active Morpho Market but without borrowing TVL on July 3, 2026.
• Stress Scenario: In a basis-blowup scenario (futures premium collapse, exchange counterparty event, staking / liquid-staking impairment, or simultaneous redemption surge), the fund's liquidity depends on (a) unwinding futures positions at potentially worse-than-market prices, (b) Anchorage's and related venues' ability to deliver spot / staked assets, and (c) the futures venues' ability to honor margin. T-Bills and USTB are highly liquid; major spot crypto is normally liquid but can gap during stress; futures positions can become illiquid during stress because basis spreads can widen materially before they converge. The mark-to-market NAV will reflect this stress in real time, potentially producing principal losses for holders and realized losses for users redeeming through the offchain settlement window.

AllowList Freeze Risk (Critical for DeFi Integrations)

Identical to USTB: if an address is removed from the shared AllowList, USCC tokens at that address are completely frozen with zero exit paths:

1. transfer / transferFrom revert (AllowList checks both sender and receiver)
2. offchainRedeem reverts (requires AllowList status)
3. bridge reverts (requires AllowList)
4. No DEX fallback ($0 liquidity + AllowList-gated DEX contracts would need permission too)

The only recovery is to be re-whitelisted by Superstate or have Superstate adminBurn and process an offchain payment manually.

Centralization & Control Risks

Governance

Governance Model: Fully centralized — Superstate Inc. controls all administrative functions. No onchain governance, no DAO, no community voting.

Key Privileged Roles (verified onchain, Jul 3, 2026):

Role	Address	Type	Powers
USCC Token Owner + USCC ProxyAdmin Owner	0x8abC89D9b56dFD90dA18e8E18CFaC9111100bDd1	EOA	mint, bulkMint, adminBurn, pause/unpause, accountingPause/accountingUnpause, setOracle, setRedemptionContract, setStablecoinConfig, setChainIdSupport, setMaximumOracleDelay, and upgrade()/upgradeAndCall() of the USCC implementation via ProxyAdmin. This single EOA controls both the token and its proxy admin, matching the USTB token/ProxyAdmin ownership pattern rather than improving on it.
AllowList Owner (shared with USTB)	0x7747940aDBc7191f877a9B90596E0DA4f8deb2Fe	EOA	setEntityIdForAddress, setProtocolAddressPermission, etc. Can also upgrade AllowList via its ProxyAdmin.
Chainlink USCC NAV Aggregator Owner	0x21f73D42Eb58Ba49dDB685dc29D3bF5c0f0373CA	Chainlink contract	Chainlink-side governance over the OCR feed; not Superstate-controlled.

Critical centralization concerns specific to USCC (in addition to USTB-style risks):

1. Single EOA controls both token and ProxyAdmin. This matches USTB's token/ProxyAdmin concentration (0xad309b… owns both on USTB). A compromise of 0x8abC89D9… lets the attacker mint unlimited USCC AND upgrade the implementation to embed any logic. There is no multisig and no timelock.
2. No timelock on any operation — proxy upgrades, parameter changes, and mint/burn execute immediately.
3. Unlimited admin mint with no onchain backing check — the owner can call mint(any_addr, any_amount) without depositing collateral. The backing-vs-supply relationship is enforced offchain only.
4. adminBurn confiscation — the owner can burn tokens from any holder. Documented as a regulatory-compliance tool.
5. NAV oracle is admin-set — although the Chainlink aggregator is Chainlink-controlled (16 OCR nodes), the NAV value itself is reported by Superstate to the OCR network. A malicious or compromised Superstate reporter could push an incorrect NAV — onchain there is no validation against the actual portfolio.
6. AllowList control (shared with USTB) — can freeze any holder; can revoke whitelisted DeFi protocol addresses unilaterally.

Mitigations (same shape as USTB):

• Superstate states it uses Turnkey secure enclaves for admin keys. This may reduce operational key-compromise risk, but it is not verifiable onchain and does not change the contract-level fact that the owner is a single EOA.
• Ownable2StepUpgradeable two-step transfer
• renounceOwnership disabled
• Regulatory accountability: Superstate Inc. is a U.S. corporation under SEC exemptions, SEC-registered transfer agent (Superstate Services LLC), Reg D / 3(c)(7) framework

Programmability

• NAV pricing: Chainlink OCR feed only. Updated as the Chainlink network transmits new rounds (cadence depends on heartbeat / deviation thresholds).
• Subscriptions: Admin-driven (mint/bulkMint only). Onchain user subscribe() is explicitly disabled (OnchainSubscriptionsDisabled()).
• Redemptions: User-initiated burn (offchainRedeem) is onchain and programmatic, but settlement is offchain (T+1/T+2). No atomic onchain payout.
• Transfers: AllowList enforcement on every transfer (onchain and programmatic).
• Bridging: Burn-and-mint to Solana (Token-2022) and Plume via bridge() — programmatic per chain, but only enabled chain IDs are mintable destinations.

USCC is materially less programmatic than USTB: no atomic onchain subscribe, no atomic onchain redeem.

External Dependencies

1. Anchorage Digital Bank N.A. (Critical) — qualified custodian for spot crypto and cash. OCC-regulated. Operational failure or custodial breach is direct loss to fund holders.
2. Futures Trading Venues (Critical) — counterparties for short futures legs and margin. Current public holdings identify CME and Coinbase exposure, but concentration / margin policy is not fully public. Venue or clearing failure can be a direct loss.
3. Bitwise Investment Manager (Critical) — current investment manager. Daily portfolio management for the basis trades. Operational track record at Bitwise is strong (institutional crypto asset manager), but the recent transition still introduces post-handoff monitoring risk.
4. U.S. Treasury Market (Critical) — for T-Bill reserves, same as USTB.
5. Chainlink (Medium-High) — sole onchain NAV oracle. No fallback Superstate-run oracle, unlike USTB.
6. Circle (Medium) — USDC redemption rail.
7. Ernst & Young (Low) — annual audit.
8. NAV Fund Services (Low) — independent NAV calculator.
9. Turnkey (Medium) — admin key custody (same as USTB).
10. Staking / liquid-staking infrastructure (Medium) — current holdings include staked SOL, weETH, and JitoSOL exposure. Slashing, validator, liquid-staking-token, or staking-provider failures can flow through NAV; public materials do not fully describe provider concentration or risk controls.

Operational Risk

• Team: Same as USTB. Robert Leshner (CEO, Compound Finance co-founder), Reid Cuming (COO), Jim Hiltner (BD), Dean Swennumson (Ops). ~23 employees per public reporting.
• Funding: $100.5M total raised; Series B of $82.5M closed January 2026 (Bain Capital Crypto, Distributed Global, Brevan Howard Digital, Galaxy Digital, Haun Ventures).
• Documentation: Generally comprehensive, but USCC-specific operational documentation (counterparty concentration, leverage, staking / liquid-staking provider policy, margin policy) is noticeably thinner than USTB documentation. The fund Offering Documents (private) presumably cover this; the public docs do not.
• Legal Structure:
  • Superstate Inc. (Delaware corporation) — investment adviser
  • Superstate Asset Trust (Delaware Statutory Trust) — series-based, bankruptcy-remote
  • Superstate Advisers LLC — Exempt Reporting Adviser (SEC)
  • Superstate Services LLC — SEC-registered transfer agent
  • Reg D 506(c) / Section 3(c)(7) — Qualified Purchasers and Accredited Investors
• Manager Transition: Superstate Inc. → Bitwise Investment Manager LLC became effective June 1, 2026 — a recent material operational change. Continued post-transition monitoring is warranted.
• Incident Response: Same Turnkey TEE key management as USTB. No publicly documented USCC-specific incident playbook (e.g., what happens if a futures venue fails).
• License: BUSL 1.1.

Monitoring

Key Contracts to Monitor

Contract	Address	Purpose	Key Events / Functions
USCC Token	0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c	Token state	Mint, AdminBurn, OffchainRedeem, Bridge, BridgeToBookEntry, Paused/Unpaused, AccountingPaused/AccountingUnpaused, SetOracle, SetRedemptionContract, SetStablecoinConfig, SetChainIdSupport, OwnershipTransferStarted, totalSupply()
USCC ProxyAdmin	0x2Bb7B8B4dF7fD96baF7CB9a2Ce9e292eCd5BAF3D	USCC proxy upgrades	Upgraded event on the USCC proxy; OwnershipTransferred on the ProxyAdmin
AllowList V3.1 (shared)	0x02f1fA8B196d21c7b733EB2700B825611d8A38E5	Permission changes	EntityIdSet, ProtocolAddressPermissionSet, PrivateInstrumentPermissionSet
Chainlink USCC NAV Oracle wrapper	0xAfFd8F5578E8590665de561bdE9E7BAdb99300d9	NAV reporting	AnswerUpdated, latestRoundData()
Chainlink USCC Aggregator	0x5C00518D3d423EC59D553Af123Be8a63B11078CF	OCR transmission	NewTransmission, ConfigSet

Admin EOAs to Monitor

EOA	Role	Key Actions
0x8abC89D9b56dFD90dA18e8E18CFaC9111100bDd1	USCC Token + ProxyAdmin Owner	mint, adminBurn, pause, upgrade() USCC impl
0x7747940aDBc7191f877a9B90596E0DA4f8deb2Fe	AllowList Owner (shared with USTB)	Add/remove addresses; revoke protocol permissions

Critical Monitoring Points

• NAV/Share: Read the Chainlink USCC feed every transmission. Unlike USTB, NAV may decrease during basis stress — alert on day-over-day declines >2% to investigate whether it reflects market mark-to-market or an attestation issue.
• Admin Burns: Monitor AdminBurn events — forced burns from holder addresses are critical.
• Pause Events: Monitor Paused/Unpaused and AccountingPaused/AccountingUnpaused on USCC token.
• Contract Upgrades: Monitor USCC ProxyAdmin 0x2Bb7B8B4dF7fD96baF7CB9a2Ce9e292eCd5BAF3D for Upgraded events. No timelock — upgrades are instant.
• AllowList Changes: Monitor ProtocolAddressPermissionSet events on the shared AllowList for revocation of any contract holding USCC.
• Ownership Transfers: Monitor OwnershipTransferStarted on USCC token and ProxyAdmin.
• Large Supply Changes: Alert on mints/burns >5% of total supply in 24h.
• Manager Transition (effective Jun 1, 2026): Track for any operational disruption after the Superstate → Bitwise handoff.
• Recommended Frequency: Per-transmission for NAV. Hourly for pause/admin events. Daily for AllowList changes.

Appendix: Contract Architecture

Verified onchain Jul 3, 2026. All Superstate-controlled owners are EOAs (code size 0). No multisig, no timelock on any contract.

GOVERNANCE LAYER
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
  [EOA-USCC]  USCC Token owner + USCC ProxyAdmin owner
              0x8abC89D9b56dFD90dA18e8E18CFaC9111100bDd1
              (single EOA, code size 0)

  [EOA-AL]    AllowList owner (shared with USTB)
              0x7747940aDBc7191f877a9B90596E0DA4f8deb2Fe

  [CL-OWN]    Chainlink USCC NAV Aggregator owner (Chainlink-controlled)
              0x21f73D42Eb58Ba49dDB685dc29D3bF5c0f0373CA


PROXY ADMIN LAYER
═════════════════
  [PA-USCC]   USCC ProxyAdmin (owned by [EOA-USCC])
              0x2Bb7B8B4dF7fD96baF7CB9a2Ce9e292eCd5BAF3D
              ── upgrade(USCC proxy) → impl 0x9b7282Cb…

  [PA-AL]     AllowList ProxyAdmin (separate; verified for USTB)
              0xb819692a58db9dd4d3b403a875439b6ca155c610


TOKEN LAYER
═══════════
  [USCC]   USCC Token (Proxy)
           0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c
           impl: 0x9b7282Cb80baA4B1F8F6436f8D531B436BaE2A70
           VERSION "5" (SuperstateTokenV5 family)

           Admin (owner [EOA-USCC] only):
           ├── mint() / bulkMint()      ← no onchain backing check
           ├── adminBurn(address, amount)
           ├── pause() / unpause()
           ├── accountingPause() / accountingUnpause()
           ├── setOracle(newOracle)     ← currently 0x0 (no SuperstateOracle)
           ├── setRedemptionContract(newContract)
           │                            ← currently 0x0 (no RedemptionIdle)
           ├── setStablecoinConfig(stablecoin, dest, fee)
           │                            ← USDC currently unset
           ├── setChainIdSupport(chainId, supported)
           └── setMaximumOracleDelay(delay)
                                        ← currently 0

           User functions (AllowList-gated):
           ├── subscribe(...)           ← REVERTS: OnchainSubscriptionsDisabled
           ├── offchainRedeem(amount)   ← burn; settled offchain T+1
           ├── bridge(amount, dest, chainId, ...)
           ├── bridgeToBookEntry(amount)
           └── transfer / transferFrom


PROTOCOL LAYER
══════════════
  [AL] AllowList V3.1 (Proxy)            [CL] Chainlink USCC NAV Feed
       0x02f1fA8B196d21c7b733EB2700B…         0xAfFd8F5578E8590665de561b…
       owner: [EOA-AL]                        wraps aggregator 0x5C00518D…
       (SHARED WITH USTB)                     owner: [CL-OWN] (Chainlink)

       Admin:                                 Mechanics:
       ├ setEntityIdForAddress()              ├ 16 OCR transmitters
       ├ setProtocolAddressPermission()       ├ NAV reported by Superstate
       ├ setEntityAllowedFor...()             └ No interpolation between rounds
       └ transferOwnership()

       Gating: isAllowed() onchain on
       every USCC transfer/burn/bridge


EXTERNAL / UNDERLYING LAYER
════════════════════════════
  Offchain:
  ├── Anchorage Digital Bank N.A. and related venues (spot / staked crypto + cash custody)
  ├── Trading Venues (futures + margin) — current holdings identify CME and Coinbase; margin policy not fully public
  ├── Bitwise Investment Manager (investment manager, effective Jun 1, 2026)
  ├── Ernst & Young (annual auditor)
  ├── NAV Fund Services (NAV calculation agent)
  └── U.S. Treasury Bills (reserves)

  Cross-chain destinations (via bridge()):
  ├── Solana mainnet: Token-2022 BTRR3sj1Bn2ZjuemgbeQ6SCtf84iXS81CS7UDTSxUCaK
  └── Plume mainnet: 0x4c21b7577c8fe8b0b0669165ee7c8f67fa1454cf

Address Legend:

Label	Address
[EOA-USCC]	0x8abC89D9b56dFD90dA18e8E18CFaC9111100bDd1
[EOA-AL]	0x7747940aDBc7191f877a9B90596E0DA4f8deb2Fe
[CL-OWN]	0x21f73D42Eb58Ba49dDB685dc29D3bF5c0f0373CA
[PA-USCC]	0x2Bb7B8B4dF7fD96baF7CB9a2Ce9e292eCd5BAF3D
[PA-AL]	0xb819692a58db9dd4d3b403a875439b6ca155c610
[USCC] Token (Proxy)	0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c
USCC Implementation	0x9b7282Cb80baA4B1F8F6436f8D531B436BaE2A70
[AL] AllowList V3.1 (Proxy)	0x02f1fA8B196d21c7b733EB2700B825611d8A38E5
[CL] Chainlink USCC NAV	0xAfFd8F5578E8590665de561bdE9E7BAdb99300d9
Chainlink USCC Aggregator	0x5C00518D3d423EC59D553Af123Be8a63B11078CF

---

Reassessment Triggers

• Time-based: Reassess in 3 months (Oct 2026) — shorter interval than USTB due to (a) the recent Bitwise manager transition effective Jun 1, 2026, (b) basis-trade NAV volatility warrants more frequent review, and (c) onchain-redemption infrastructure could change.
• TVL-based: Reassess if AUM changes by more than 30% (more sensitive than USTB given thinner holder base).
• Incident-based: Reassess after any exploit, admin key compromise, contract upgrade, AllowList policy change, manager transition issue, or any large NAV drawdown (>5% in a single day).
• Strategy-based: Reassess on any change to futures venues, staking / liquid-staking provider policy, leverage policy, or asset mix (e.g., addition of new basis pairs).
• Governance-based: Reassess if Superstate adopts multisig or timelock for USCC admin controls.